

## **Desire accounts of Well-Being and Irrelevant Desires**

What makes a life good for the person who lives it? In other words, what is it to fare well or poorly in life? Hedonism gives a familiar answer: we fare well when our lives contain more pleasure than pain; poorly when the pain outweighs the pleasure. Desire Satisfactionism (DS), yields a different answer: we fare well when our desires are satisfied; poorly when they are frustrated. A popular objection to DS plays on the fact that a persons desires may extend to objects that seem entirely irrelevant to his well-being. If I want a stranger Ive met on a train to be cured of his disease, is my life improved if unbeknownst to me he is cured years later, half-way around the globe, long after I have forgotten about him? How could *his* cure leave me better off if it doesnt affect *me* at all? I respond by arguing that *other things being equal* we are always left better off when our desires are satisfied, even when our desires have objects that seem irrelevant to our well-being. I respond to versions of the objection offered by Derek Parfit, Thomas Scanlon, James Griffin, Shelly Kagan, and others.

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