

## **Is Millian Rule Utilitarianism Incoherent?**

Much of the recent literature on Mill's moral theory depicts him as a rule utilitarian. Whether or not this is accurate, one can still describe the version of rule utilitarianism (RU) to which there is some evidence that he subscribes as Millian. By "Millian RU" I mean to refer to both this version of RU itself and the argument for it that some commentators take to be implicit in Mill's work. Millian RU is sufficiently plausible, at least *prima facie*, to be well worth examining regardless of whether he actually held it himself. In this paper I develop Millian RU in greater detail than has been done previously. I then consider whether it is vulnerable to the so-called "incoherence" or "rule worship" objection, which states that one cannot argue for RU without presupposing a theory of practical reason that in fact entails act utilitarianism. I will look at two versions of this objection: The "subjective" version says that agents who understood the Millian argument for RU would be unwilling to obey it, while the "objective" version says that agents who obeyed Millian RU would be acting irrationally.

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